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I. Introduction 
 
The issue of corruption has recently become a heated debate among economists and 
international development institutions. The World Bank has identified corruption as among 
the “greatest obstacles to economic and social development. It undermines development by 
distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic 
growth depends.” Citing empirical evidence that corruption impedes development and 
undermines good governance in developing countries, many donor countries and 
development institutions have emphasized reducing corruption as a major development tool. 
Despite these sustained commitments and increased efforts, evidence available as of today 
suggests that the intensity of corruption is far from having subsided and may even becoming 
worse in some resource-rich developing countries. 
As of the late 1990s, due to difficulties associated with measuring corruption, efforts 
to gauge the impacts of corruption were fraught with ambiguity and controversy; earlier 
literature on corruption concluded that corruption could be a desirable one. Leff (1964) and 
Huntington (1968) suggested that bribes acted as “grease money” or “speedy money” which 
allowed individuals to avoid bureaucratic delay and obtain public goods and hence promoted 
growth. They argued that corruption acted like a piece meal, thus providing incentives for 
government officials to work harder. Similar views were shared by Lui (1996; 1985) who 
argued that corruption acted as an optimal response to market distortion. Their findings, 
however, were rigorously contested and challenged subsequently as more and more evidence 
and data become available; Shleifer and Vishny (1993) provided preliminary argument that 
corruption tend to lower economic growth, and Rose-Ackerman (1978) argued that it is 
unrealistic to limit corruption to areas in which it might be economically desirable; Murphy, 
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Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) showed that societies where highly trained individuals were 
allocated to rent-seeking activities tended to grow slowly. 
So, why do we care so much about corruption? Corruption can give rise to deleterious 
consequences. One of them is its impact on growth. There are a number of ways through 
which corruption can inhibit growth. Confronted with uncertainty and corrupt bureaucracy, 
economic agents become reluctant to commit resource to future contracts. Consequently, few 
investors will allocate their resource in risky economic activities where corrupt bureaucratic 
practices and malfeasance can wipe away their investment returns. Consequently, investment 
will decline and hence growth will be depressed. Using ethnic-linguistic fractionalization as 
an instrumental variable for government institutions and subjective indices of bureaucratic 
honesty, Mauro (1995) showed that corruption tends to lower saving rate, and eventually 
lower economic growth. He found that a one standard deviation increase in bureaucratic 
honesty is associated with a one half percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate. 
The changing international economic environment prompted development agencies 
and governments to argue for the merits of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a primary 
mean by which developing economies can sustain economic growth. A direct consequence of 
this initiative was that researchers began to consider corruption as a major determinant of 
FDI exogenously. Earlier literature, however, failed to establish a negative association 
between corruption and FDI. Wheeler and Mody (1992) found no strong evidence that 
corruption reduced inflow of foreign direct investment. A similar conclusion was drawn by 
Hines (1995). The unavailability of reliable measures of corruption could have contributed to 
this negative finding as the measure they were using combined twelve other indicators which 
could well be of less relevance to investors. As higher quality indices became available in 
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late 1990s, this was no longer an issue and corruption has proven to be negatively associated 
with FDI. Using commercially available corruption indices and bilateral investment from 14 
OECD countries to 45 host countries, Wei (2000) showed that an increase in corruption level 
from that of Singapore to that of Mexico has the same negative impact on inflow of 
investment as raising a tax from eighteen percent to fifty percent on investors. To reduce 
financial and appropriation risks, investors operating in highly corrupt countries are prone to 
forge joint ventures with local firms. On the other hand, technologically more advanced firms 
are found to be less likely to engage in partnerships with local firms (Smarzynska & Wei – 
2000). Hines (1995) also found that U.S. firms are the least likely to enter joint venture 
partnerships with local authorities or firms. 
While the potential benefits and merits of FDI and the pernicious effects of 
corruption have been appreciated, one fundamental issue remains unsolved: potential 
endogeneity of corruption. Our study is fully motivated by asking the questions: Are the 
consequences of corruption different across economies? Are reactions towards corruption 
different among investors?  How can governments of host economies influence corruption 
and FDI? We feel that research on the implications of increasing FDI inflow in host countries 
lags very much behind. None of the studies mentioned earlier address this issue. In 
conventional FDI empirical studies, the perceived corruption level in host countries is treated 
as being exogenous and the possibility of a two-way causal relationship between corruption 
and FDI has largely been disregarded. Consequently, the estimation by OLS will produce 
inconsistent and biased results should corruption and FDI be jointly determined. In this 
article, we try to fill this gap by systematically examining how corruption and FDI can co-
evolve conditional on the development level and the availability of natural resources. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Sections II & III present the case as to 
why corruption could potentially be endogenous to FDI. Section IV briefly discusses the data 
used in this study. Section V discusses results followed by conclusions in section VI. 
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II. Is corruption endogenous to FDI in resource-rich economies?  
The preponderance of empirical studies on corruption focus on its consequences, 
including the factor’s propensity to deter the inflow of FDI as it acts like a tax on investors 
(Wei 2000). It has been assumed here that the determinants and consequences of FDI are 
formulated by two mutually independent equations, i.e. investors take corruption as given; 
investors and host economies have no influence on each other and, hence, there is no mutual 
relationship among them. A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that this might not 
always be the case. Are there economic or political factors under the control of host countries 
that can be maneuvered by host countries’ government to attract investors and vice versa? Or 
are host countries merely playing passive roles in determining the direction of FDI? Consider 
a fledgling economy with abundant natural resource, operating under weak institutions or 
tenuous political regimes, and is relatively closed to the rest of the world. Also, let’s assume 
that this economy is facing extreme credit constraints with no access to international lending 
institutions. Will these unique economic and political dimensions play significant role in 
attracting FDI? Indeed, this study is fully motivated by observing some idiosyncratic 
behaviors of investors who are not deterred by the pervasiveness of corruption in some host 
countries. Still, it has always been a convention in FDI literature that investors react 
pessimistically towards widespread corruption and have no influence on corruption levels in 
host countries. Investors are being treated in the literature as a homogeneous group of 
economic agents deliberately eschewing paying bribes, malfeasance, and public grafts. As a 
result, investors tend to avoid investing in countries with high level corruption. While this 
may be true for majority of investors, recent developments and evidence surfacing from some 
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developing countries suggest there may be some cases where corruption and FDI can be 
jointly determined.   
We depart from this strict assumption and assume instead that investors are different 
in their strategic goals and perceptions towards corruption. Depending upon local economic 
and political conditions, investors will strategically adjust their operations and modes of 
entry, and ultimately become attuned to local norms. If promised exclusive rent sharing 
opportunities and monopolistic power by host governments, investors will gradually become 
acclimatized to strategies and operational practices conducive to local norms, economic 
circumstances and political environment. Moreover, the extent to which investors are 
guaranteed rents and a favorable regulatory framework depends upon the underlying 
economic and political systems prevailing in host countries, the development level 
(technological know-how, depth of financial market, infrastructure, etc.), the strength and 
maturity of institutions under existing political and economic systems, and societal and 
cultural norms. The amount of bribe payment and license fees demanded by host economies’ 
governments depends upon the rents offered to investors. Definitely, entering a market with 
high corruption level may entail cost at first. However, to some investors, it may be worth 
entering the market if the total expected returns exceed costs. In extreme cases, worsening 
economic and political situations in resource-rich developing economies beset by economic 
woes such as high inflation will prompt governments to consume more FDI through sale of 
natural resource in exchange for much-needed foreign currencies. It is, therefore, conceivable 
that not only can corruption in host countries affect FDI inflow, but FDI inflow can in turn 
affect the magnitude of corruption.  
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Countries like Burma, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, and Indonesia, just to name it a few, 
offer singularly strong evidence of this. These countries have many similarities: They rank 
high on corruption level, have abundant natural resources, have weak institutions governed 
by authoritarian regimes (Burma, Algeria, Angola), and democratic governments (Indonesia, 
Nigeria) whose bureaucracies are fraught with corruption and excessive red tape. Yet, they 
remain favorite destinations for many investors, foreign and domestic alike. Burma is ranked 
by Transparency International (TI) as among countries with the highest level of corruption in 
the world. Yet it has been receiving a sizable inflow of FDI for many years from Asian 
nations intent on securing access to its natural resources. Indonesia offers another interesting 
paradox. Foreign investment stock in Indonesia has been growing steadily despite persistent 
high corruption. These anecdotal evidences suggest that all investors can not be treated as a 
homogeneous group. Their tolerance level towards corruption and their adaptability to 
corrupt environments may be flexible enough for corruption to become less of an issue if 
promises of rent sharing opportunities exist in host economies. 
As we have previously mentioned, rent seeking opportunities available to foreign 
investors depend upon the level of and abundance of natural resources in host countries. 
Demand for foreign direct investment (be technical, financial, or legal) will be relatively high 
in less developed countries endowed with natural resource. The primary reason for this is that 
there are many practical challenges facing less developed resource-rich economies; liquidity 
constraints may prevent them from investing in extractive, primary, and lucrative domestic 
industries; lack of technological know-how prevents them from exploring and exploiting 
domestic natural resource; and low levels of human capital may not permit them to nurture 
and develop domestic industries. Faced with these economic and technological constraints, 
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they are forced to share rents with foreign investors in exchange for much-needed foreign 
currencies and revenues. Classis example includes, but not limited to, Burma which has 
entered contracts worth of billions dollar with countries like China, India, and some Asian 
economies that will permit these countries to explore and exploit its natural resource in 
exchange for much-needed foreign currencies. In such a situation where an under-developed 
economy with abundant natural resource exchanges economic rents for foreign revenues with 
foreign investors, corruption in host countries will not deter some investors from investing, 
or in the worst scenarios, may even facilitate economic exchange between host countries and 
foreign investors. 
To provide preliminary evidence to support my claim, I present a summary of 
statistics of how corruption and FDI inflow correlate with each other over time in resource-
rich developing economies. Tables 1&2 present data on the average corruption perception 
index (CPI) (subjective measure of corruption), Polity (an index for democracy), and FDI in 
millions of dollars flowing into resource-rich economies with income per capital less than 
US$ 5000. The Original Corruption Perception Index ranks countries on a scale of 1 to 10 
with 1 being the most corrupt and 10 being the least. We reverse the order so that 1 
represents the least corrupt and 10 being the most corrupt. Polity is an index for democracy 
and authoritativeness ranging from a value of -10 to 10 (-10 represents the most authoritarian 
regime, 10 the most democratic regime and 0 being neutral). We change the original scale by 
adding 10 so that 1 represents the most authoritarian regime and 20 the most democratic 
regime, with 10 being neutral. Here, we use income per capita and fuel export as percentage 
of total merchandise export as proxies for development level and natural resource abundance. 
Tables 1&2 reveal that the inflow of FDI into resource-rich developing economies has 
 9
increased steadily since 2000, while corruption levels remain almost stable over time. Of 
course, a higher inflow of FDI may be affected by other factors. However, this observation 
may convince us to a certain degree that the relationship between FDI and corruption may 
not necessarily be a negative one as existing literature has suggested. 
Table (1): Summary Statistics of Economies with GNIPC < $5000 & Fuel > 10 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Average CPI 7.32 7.35 7.33 7.39 7.32 7.20 7.40 
Average Polity 10.46 10.79 11.11 10.94 11.00 12.33 10.93 
Average FDI (Mil $) 515 628 743 1009 1443 2079 1551 
 
 
Table (2): Summary Statistics of Economies with GNIPC < $5000 & Fuel > 20 
Year  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Average CPI 7.51 7.46 7.41 7.41 7.28 7.28 7.33 
Average Polity 9.68 9.96 10.44 10.17 9.78 10.64 9.75 
Average FDI (Mil $) 518 751 836 1144 1532 1955 2058 
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III. What Can We Learn From The New Evidence? 
If one were to take a 9000-mile-long drive starting at Africa’s northernmost part in 
Egypt and ending at African’s southernmost extreme in South Africa, one would be amazed 
to discover that the road on which one is traveling is no different from the state-of-the-art 
highway in the U.S. The entire journey will cover 12 countries and take 2 weeks. These 
newly-built highways were constructed with generous financial and technological assistance 
from the Government of the People’s Republic of China. As this journalistic anecdote 
illustrates, investment dollars coming from China to the African continent have been 
exploding, reaching a total of US$100 billion in 2007. In 2006 alone, China signed a trade 
pact worth US$60 billion with African countries; between 2000 and 2005, foreign direct 
investment coming from China totaled US$ 30 billion. China’s commitment to African 
countries is enormous; in November 2006, China convened the first Sino-African summit in 
Beijing in a grandiose scale; almost every African leaders attended the summit: big and 
small, haves and have-nots, the clean and the corrupt, democratic and authoritarian. In 2005, 
China pleaded that investment amounts would grow to US$100 billion a year within five 
years1. As of today, almost all African nations have economic ties with Beijing. China will 
soon eclipse all major developed economies as the biggest investor in Africa.2 
Evidence available today suggests that investors’ perception towards corruption may 
not be as universal as the current literature assumes. Why do countries like China invest 
heavily in African economies that have always been synonymous with high corruption, civil 
unrest, poverty, social problems? As far as China’s venture in Africa is concerned, the 
                                                 
1 All statistics adapted from “Dead Aid” by Dambisa Moyo (2009).  
2 Cited from “Dead Aid” Dambisa Moyo (2009). 
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motive is clear – China needs access to resources to fuel its exploding economy and fulfill its 
insatiable demand for energy; Africa needs China’s financial and technological prowess; 
Africa has what China wants; China has what Africa needs. As such, to fully appreciate the 
impact of corruption on FDI and vice versa, we have to make a clear distinction between 
foreign direct investment that is circulating around developed economies and resource-rich 
developing economies.  
The point that we are making is that combining developed and developing economies 
into a single FDI equation may not be appropriate. In fact, investors’ reaction to corruption in 
host economies varies depending upon the type of economies they are dealing with, nature of 
regimes, and investors’ strategic objectives. Table (3) below shows two groups of economies, 
namely OECD member countries and non-OECD countries. OECD countries constitute 14% 
of all observations in our sample. Yet, they receive the lion’s share of FDI (68%). On the 
other hand, non-OECD countries make up 86% of entire observations, while taking in only 
32% of world FDI share over 2000 to 2006. There is also a huge discrepancy in the average 
corruption perception index between the two groups; average CPI in OECD countries is 2.26, 
whereas it is 6.58 in non-OECD countries. 
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Table (3): Comparison between OECD and Non-OECD Countries (2000 to 2006) 
 OECD Non-OECD 
Share of Foreign Direct Investment 68% 32% 
# of Observations 168 1036 
Percentage in all observations 14% 86% 
Average Corruption Perception Index 2.26 6.58 
 
 
Table (4): Share of World FDI Stock By Economies 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
US 21% 21% 12% 10% 19% 10% 13% 
UK 8% 7% 3% 4% 10% 19% 10% 
Germany 14% 3% 7% 5% -1% 3% 3% 
Luxembourg NA NA 16% 14% 10% 11% 9% 
Total 43% 31% 39% 33% 38% 43% 36% 
 
It becomes more striking if we further disaggregate OECD countries and take four countries 
(namely US, UK, Germany, and Luxembourg as shown in Table 5). In 2000, three countries 
– US, UK, and Germany – took in 43% of world’s FDI3 stock. Luxembourg, a very small 
country with a population of less than half a million, took in 16% of world FDI stock in 
2002. Luxembourg is ranked second only to the U.S. in attracting investment funds in the 
world. Its financial sector accounts for a hefty 30% of its GDP. For Luxembourg, the ability 
to attract US$118 billion worth of investment funds a year is a direct consequence of foreign 
financial institutions taking advantage of a favorable regulatory environment. The key point 
is that if we are to combine OECD and non-OECD economies together, and then regress FDI 
on corruption perception index together with other major determinants of FDI, we will for 
sure get a very strong negative association between corruption and FDI inflow. We feel that 
pooling all economies in a single OLS equation is an inappropriate research strategy.   
                                                 
3 According to the World Bank, FDI is defined as net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of 
voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of 
earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of payments. 
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On the other hand, if we break down economies by income level, regime types, and 
level of resource endowment, the negative association between FDI and corruption becomes 
less clear and even becomes positive in some situation as illustrated by figure 1, 2, 3, & 4. 
Figure (1) shows scatter plot of LnFDI Vs CPI for economies whose income per capita is less 
than $5000 and whose fuel exports as percentage of total merchandise export exceed 10 
percent (fuel > 10). Preliminary investigation shows that the association between LnFDI and 
CPI has changed from being negative to positive, suggesting that high corruption is 
positively associated with high foreign direct investment activities in developing economies 
rich in natural resource. Figure (2) shows scatter plot of LnFDI Vs CPI for economies 
managed by authoritarian regime (Polity < 10) and whose fuel exports as percentage of 
merchandise export exceed 30 percent (fuel > 30). Across the four figures, a positive 
association between FDI and CPI gradually becomes more pronounced. Even in the absence 
of natural resources, economies run by extreme authoritarian and dictatorial regimes will still 
be able to attract foreign investment by offering a favorable regulatory environment, and 
sharing rents with investors. Figure (3) shows a scatter plot of LnFDI Vs CPI conditional on 
extreme authoritarian regimes (Polity < 5) and figure (4) is conditional on African countries 
rich in natural resource. In all of these cases, FDI is positively associated with high 
corruption level. Of course, the data generating process may also be affected by various other 
factors which we will control for in a subsequent section. Nevertheless, the positive 
association between corruption and foreign direct investment is strong enough to convince us 
that the impacts of corruption can be different for different economies and, in some 
situations, corruption may well be influenced by FDI inflow and hence endogenous to FDI.    
 14
 
Figure (1) 
LnFDI Vs Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(GNIPC < $5000 & Fuel > 10) 
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Figure (2) 
 LnFDI Vs Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(Fuel > 30 & Polity < 10) 
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Figure (3) 
LnFDI Vs Corruption Perception Index (CPI)  
(Polity < 5) 
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Figure (4) 
 LnFDI Vs Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
(African Countries with Fuel > 10) 
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IV. Data 
Data from year 2000 to year 2006 are pooled together. The choice of 2000 for the 
starting to 2006 is inspired by the desire to use latest available data. One hundred seventy 
two countries with a wide spectrum of development levels, corruption levels, geographical 
locations, political systems, and economic systems are included. The list of countries is 
shown in appendix B.  
To statistically show that corruption can be endogenous to FDI, we will first regress 
the corruption variable on FDI using OLS. Then, we will propose a system of simultaneous 
equation to account for the joint determination of corruption and FDI. Objective measures 
for corruption are hardly available, as the dealings are taking place in secrecy4. 
Consequently, subjective measures relying on questionnaire-based surveys become a 
compromise for this shortcoming. They measure perceived corruption rather than corruption 
per se. One particular problem with using a subjective measure is that different 
methodologies used can generate different results and are prone to personal bias. Three 
subjective indices for corruption are available and are widely used in the political science, 
economics and sociology literature. The first index is based on opinions and responses 
provided by experts working in various countries. Such indexes include the Business 
International (BI) Index and International Country Risk Group (ICRG) Index. Since they rely 
heavily upon responses given by individuals, it is the most subject to personal biasness and 
the variations from person to person can be high.  
The second type of index is based on the results of survey questionnaires given to 
firms working at the international level. The index for each country is then obtained by 
                                                 
4 For example, it is very difficult to measure how much bribes have been paid. Or, how many bureaucrats have been arrested on charges of 
fraught or embezzlement.  
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averaging all responses. Examples of this type of index include the Global Competitiveness 
Report Index (GCR) compiled by the World Economic Forum and the World Development 
Report (WDR) by the World Bank. The third type of index relies on averaging all available 
indexes, experts’ opinions, surveys given to local populations and foreigners, and available 
country information. The main advantage of averaging all available information is that it 
reduces the amount of variation associated with personal bias. Such example includes the 
Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perception Index (CPI) produced by a Berlin-
based think-tank group committing to fighting corruption around the world. The CPI index 
was first published in 1995. Indices for subsequent years are also available until 2008. We 
use this index in our study as it is available free of charge (other indices are available only 
commercially5). TI ranks countries on a scale of 1 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). We 
reverse the order so that 1 represents the least corrupt and 10 the most. 
Ades & Di Tella (1999) showed that the incentive to engage in corrupt practices 
increases with the availability of rents. We use two proxies for rents: fuel export as a 
percentage of total merchandise export and trade openness measured as total values of export 
and import as percentage of GDP. Our interpretation of these proxies is that an increase in 
natural resource exports creates rent seeking opportunities; a domestic market with less 
foreign competition and, hence, lower export and import volume will increase rents enjoyed 
by domestic firms, thus fostering corruption.  
We introduce a dummy variable for landlocked countries, taking a value of 1 if a 
country does not have access to international water and 0 otherwise. Sachs and Warner 
(1997) showed that landlocked African countries tend to grow slowly. We expect, however, 
                                                 
5 Fortunately, the correlation between all three indices is very high. The correlation is found to be around 0.9. 
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that being landlocked will have indirect effect on corruption by affecting the income level. 
Religion is found to have influence on the perceived cost of engaging in corruption (La Porta 
et al. 1999, Landes -1998, Putnam - 1993). They argue that societies dominated by religions 
independent of state influence and non-hierarchical in nature tend to oppose state dominance 
and, hence, exerts checks and balances on the executive and legislative branches. They found 
that societies with a high proportion of Protestants in the population have low levels of 
corruption. On the other hand, when functioning of state and religion affairs are closely 
aligned, or religious practices follow a hierarchical order, religious opposition to legislative 
and executive’s influence on societies will be weaker. Catholicism and Islam follow 
hierarchical order. Data on religious affiliation are obtained from La Porta et al (1999). 
Easterly and Levine (1997) studied how ethno-linguistic diversification in a country 
can have negative impact on growth and public policies. They found that slow growth in 
African countries is attributable to ethno-linguistic fractionalization after controlling for key 
variables. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is measured as the probability that two randomly 
selected people from a given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. 
Although originally used in foreign aid and growth literature, we use this data as a proxy for 
opposing interest which might contribute to corruption. Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization 
can influence corruption in many ways: ethnically and linguistically diverse groups can have 
different or opposing intrinsic interests in the allocation of state resource, and their elected 
officials are likely to pursue policies advantageous to their own people. Thus, we expect 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization to be positively correlated with the corruption level. Data 
for ethno-linguistic fractionalization is collected from Easterly (1997). 
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La Porta et al. (1999) argues that common law systems, mostly found in Britain and its 
former colonies, differ on this dimension from civil law systems, mostly found in mainland 
Europe and its former colonies. Common law was first introduced in England as an attempt 
to restrict state power and its influence on societies, whereas the civil law system was 
implemented as a tool by the state to control the general welfare and economic life of the 
people. Democracy and the level of development can have impact on corruption too. The risk 
of being caught and punished is high in highly developed democratic society with a free 
press, rigorous civil participations, and competitive elections (Treisman 2000). We use the 
Polity IV score for regime as a measure of democracy level. This score ranks authoritarian 
regimes on a scale of -10 to 0, with -10 being the most authoritarian and 0 the lease. 
Likewise, the democracy score ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 being the least democratic and 10 
being the most. We rescale this index from 0 to 20, with 0 being the most authoritarian and 
20 being the most democratic. Income per capita is taken as a proxy for the development 
level.  
Treisman (2000) argued that countries that are have been democratically institutionalized 
for decades tend to have lower corruption. We include a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 
if a country is a democracy throughout as of 1995 and 0 otherwise. Also, Federal states were 
found to be more corrupt than non-federal states as intense competition between autonomous 
states result in rent seeking activities (Treisman – 2000). A dummy for federal status is 
included, taking a value of 1 if a country is federally governed, zero otherwise. Having never 
been a colony before is found to be negatively associated with corruption. We include a 
dummy variable noncol, and its value is 1 if a country was a colony in the past and zero 
otherwise. We include continent dummies to control for cultural and geographical differences 
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not captured by other exogenous variables. We introduce a new variable (tropic) to test if 
corruption levels in countries located in the tropics are intrinsically higher due to cultural, 
geographical or historical uniqueness. The data for tropic is obtained from Sachs & Warner 
(1997), which studies economic impacts of malaria on African countries. Together with all 
these major determinants of corruption, we include FDI in corruption equation and test for its 
significance. Data for foreign direct investment, population, GDP, inflation, GDP growth are 
obtained from the World Bank Development Indicators CD-ROM. Data for the statutory tax 
rate was obtained from the World Bank’s Doing Business web site. Data on illiteracy rates 
was obtained from UNESCO’s database. Variable names, their description, and source are 
provided in appendix C. Summary statistics of variables used are provided in appendix A.   
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V. Results 
A. Endogeneity of Corruption  
 
We begin by  fitting a linear regression of the Corruption Perception Index to lnfdi, 
together with other major determinants of corruption for all economies. A preliminary 
investigation of the scatter plot (figure 5) suggests that the relation between corruption and 
FDI is indeed a negative one. In addition, we can casually observe two distinct groups of 
economies, namely OECD countries (marked plus sign) and Non-OECD countries (marked 
hollow circle), except for two distinct outliers Singapore and Hong Kong. Results obtain 
from OLS estimation (table 1 model 1) does confirm a negative association between 
corruption and FDI if unconditional sample is used in regression. Coefficient for lnfdi also 
survives inclusion of other major determinants of corruption. Standard errors are White-
corrected to allow for the possibility of heteroskedasticity and are shown in parenthesis. 
Figure (5) 
LnFDI Vs Corruption Perception Index (CPI) – All Economies 
0
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Table 1: Dependent Variable - Corruption Perception Index 
 Conditional On 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Unconditional Development Level Democracy 
Fuel > 10 & 
Non-OECD 
Economies 
Fuel > 10, Non-
OECD, & 
Development Level 
Fuel > 10 & 
Authoritarian Regime 
(Polity <10) 
lnfdi -0.041 ** 0.894 * 0.021   0.052 ** 0.688 * 0.076 *** 
  (0.020)   (0.050)   (0.038)   (0.028)   (0.071)   (0.041)   
lngnipc -1.011 *     -0.995 * -0.568 *     -0.542 * 
  (0.043)       (0.044)   (0.056)       (0.084)   
lnfdi_lngnipc     -0.130 *         -0.087 *     
      (0.005)           (0.009)       
Lnfdi_polity         -0.005 **             
          (0.003)               
fuel 0.015 * 0.009 * 0.015 * 0.014 * 0.010 * 0.020 * 
  (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.006)   
lnopen -0.249 * -0.393 * -0.279 * -0.622 * -0.741 * -1.258 * 
  (0.067)   (0.065)   (0.069)   (0.121)   (0.117)   (0.263)   
cath80 0.001   0.003 *** 0.002   0.014 * 0.014 * 0.043 * 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.013)   
musl80 -0.002   0.000   -0.003   0.000   0.002   0.001   
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.005)   
prot80 -0.010 * -0.009 * -0.010 * 0.009   0.012 ** -0.017   
  (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.026)   
ethnic -0.075   0.004   -0.061   0.032   0.042   -0.608   
  (0.171)   (0.167)   (0.171)   (0.268)   (0.270)   (0.451)   
asia -0.202   -0.540 * -0.274 *** 0.460   0.273   2.042 * 
  (0.143)   (0.145)   (0.147)   (0.346)   (0.353)   (0.674)   
africa -0.487 * -0.710 * -0.557 ** 0.362   0.248   3.744 * 
  (0.180)   (0.180)   (0.183)   (0.403)   (0.409)   (0.821)   
sam 0.122   -0.547 * 0.048   -0.829 ** -0.855 ** (dropped)   
  (0.159)   (0.164)   (0.163)   (0.441)   (0.443)       
meast -0.301 *** -0.973 * -0.373 ** 0.031   -0.297   4.198 * 
  (0.189)   (0.189)   (0.192)   (0.425)   (0.435)   (0.791)   
leg_british -0.605 * -0.438 * -0.562 * -1.206 * -1.091 * -3.964 * 
  (0.171)   (0.170)   (0.172)   (0.382)   (0.389)   (0.741)   
leg_french -0.493 * -0.293 *** -0.459 * -0.969 ** -0.973 * -4.387 * 
  (0.184)   (0.183)   (0.184)   (0.404)   (0.406)   (0.764)   
leg_german -0.645 * -0.459 ** -0.593 * (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.230)   (0.229)   (0.231)               
leg_scan -1.811 * -2.079 * -1.819 * (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.298)   (0.291)   (0.298)               
landlock -0.468 * -0.314 * -0.471 * 0.401 ** 0.360 ** 1.308 * 
  (0.088)   (0.086)   (0.088)   (0.172)   (0.174)   (0.349)   
polity 0.014 *** 0.005   0.042 * 0.045 * 0.044 * 0.191 * 
  (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.016)   (0.012)   (0.012)   (0.056)   
tropic 0.043   0.334 * 0.046   -0.066   -0.097   -0.389   
  (0.106)   (0.102)   (0.106)   (0.168)   (0.169)   (0.309)   
alldem95 -0.796 * -0.417 * -0.737 * -0.933 ** -1.255 * (dropped)   
  (0.126)   (0.126)   (0.129)   (0.413)   (0.410)       
_cons 15.656 * 9.292 * 15.369 * 12.715 * 9.397 * 13.680 * 
  (0.417)   (0.364)   (0.442)   (0.609)   (0.602)   (0.983)   
# of Observations 867   867   867   251   251   118   
R-squared 0.84   0.85   0.84   0.75   0.74   0.86   
Adj R-squared 0.84   0.84   0.84   0.73   0.72   0.84   
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are white corrected. 
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The estimate for lngnipc is negative and significant at 1%, suggesting that corruption 
tends to be lower in more developed countries. All else being the same, corruption tends to 
be more prevalent in economies overlying on the export of fuel and the estimate is significant 
at 1%. Economies adopting more open policies have lower levels of corruption and the 
estimate is significant at 1%. Countries with a high proportion of Protestants tend to have 
lower level of corruption as compared to predominantly Catholic and Muslim countries. 
Once the policy variable (trade openness) is controlled for, ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
(ethnic) losses its significance. We also include 4 continent dummy variables (Asia, Africa, 
South America, and Middle East) to control for intrinsic differences in perception and 
attitudes towards corruption6, and cultural and geographical difference. Estimates for four 
legal origins are significant at 1%. The claim that countries with British legal origins tend to 
have lower corruption level is not well supported. The estimate for being a landlocked 
country (landlock) is significant, but incorrectly signed. The democracy variable (Polity) is 
significant but incorrectly signed7. Consistent with our hypothesis, the corruption level in 
countries with a tropical climate is found to be higher than in non-tropical countries. 
Estimate for alldem95 – being democracies throughout the period of analysis – is significant 
at 1%. Some of the estimates are not significant and do not show the signs that we expect. 
This may be a direct consequence of aggregating all economies. 
                                                 
6 Tolerance towards corruption tends to vary from countries to countries. In some countries and societies, paying bribes and loyalties are 
considered appropriate. By including dummy variables for continent, we are assuming that each continent is different from others in its 
perception towards corruption, which may not be the case for all countries; perception towards corruption may vary across countries within 
a continent. 
7 This may be a result of aggregating all economies, democracy and non-democracy alike, resulting in incorrect sign for democracy. In 
general, we do expect negative correlation between corruption and democracy. To achieve this, we need to refine our sample. In 
unconditional sample, there are many democracies where corruption is high. Also, there are semi or non-democratic economies where 
corruption is low. 
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We shift our focus from unconditional sample to conditional ones beginning with 
development level (table 1 model 2), where we interact lnfdi and lngnipc. In contrast to the 
unconditional sample (model 1), the sign of lnfdi has changed from being negative to being 
positive, suggesting that FDI is positively associated with corruption when conditional on 
development level. As argued before, the impact of FDI activities will vary across countries, 
depending upon the development level. The positive effect of FDI on corruption diminishes 
gradually with increasing income per capital level. Once income per capita reaches a 
threshold level of US$970, an increase in FDI leads to a lower level of corruption in host 
countries. Estimates for fuel export and trade openness continue to be significant and 
correctly signed as before. All continent dummies now become significant, suggesting that 
variations in corruption level across continents are better explained after controlling for 
development level. The landlock variable continues to be significant but still incorrectly 
signed. Being a continuous democracy continues to be significant. 
To test how regime type and FDI activities combined can affect corruption in host 
countries, we interact the democracy variable with lnfdi in model 3. On a priori, we expect 
that corruption level will be less of a problem in more democratic societies. The estimate for 
lnfdi lost its significance once conditional on democracy but is still positive. This may be due 
to high variations in FDI inflow across democratic and non-democratic countries. An 
interesting case is the sign of the interacting term between FDI and democracy, which is 
negative. Thought the sign of lnfdi is positive (meaning positive correlation between FDI and 
corruption), once democracy index exceeds 5, increased FDI result in lower level of 
corruption. This can be regarded as a democracy threshold beyond which an increase in FDI 
will result in lower corruption.  
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As we have previously highlighted, corruption will increase with increasing 
availability of rents (Ades & Di Tella – 1999). This suggests that incidents and variation of 
corruption can be better analyzed and explained by lumping economies by level of resource 
availability, development level, and type of political institutions. In model 4, we only include 
non-OECD economies whose fuel exports exceed 10%. In contrast to model 1, the 
coefficient for lnfdi has changed sign from negative to positive and is statistically significant 
at 5%. Income level, fuel abundance, open policies, landlock, democracy, tropic, and being 
democracy throughout all remain significant. Countries that are democracies throughout have 
less corruption even in resource rich non-OECD countries. An interesting observation is the 
coefficient for lngnipc; when unconditional (model 1), a 1% increase in gnipc leads to a 1 
point reduction in CPI index, whereas when conditional on fuel>10 & non-OECD 
economies, a 1% increase in income level results in only 0.5 point reduction in CPI index. 
We again interact lnfdi with development level (lngnipc) for resource-rich economies 
(model 5). The coefficient for lnfdi is positive and significant at 1%. A striking observation is 
that the income threshold level beyond which increased FDI activities will lead to lower 
corruption has increased from US$970 (when unconditional in model 2) to US$2720 (when 
conditional on fuel>10, non-OECD economies in model 5). This change represents an 
increase of 180 percent as compared to model (2). We further proceed with authoritarian 
regimes (polity <10 ) in model 7 to investigate the impact of FDI activities in resource rich 
economies managed by authoritarian regimes. Not only is the key variable lnfdi is positive 
and statistically significant, its value has increased from 0.052 in model 4 to 0.076 in model 
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7, suggesting that everything else being the same, the consumption of more FDI by 
repressive regimes in resource-rich economies leads to more corruption8. 
For robustness and comparison purposes, we conduct similar investigation into non-
OECD economies with fuel exports exceeding 30% (fuel>30) and 50% (fuel>50). A priori, 
we expect the effects of lnfdi on CPI to be larger, and the threshold income level becoming 
lager with increasing availability of natural resource in host countries. Estimated results for 
fuel >30 and 50 are shown in tables 2 & 3. Compared to fuel>10, the estimate for lnfdi has 
increased (0.068 for fuel>30 and 0.086 for fuel> 50 as compared to 0.052 for fuel>10). Thus, 
these results provide support to our hypothesis that the effect of FDI on corruption is greater 
in resource-rich economies. As dependency on natural resources becomes larger and larger, 
more rent seeking opportunities are being created. These rent seeking opportunities then may 
attract the attention of foreign investors who would otherwise not invest. These are real and 
fundamental challenges facing developing countries that are naturally endowed with 
resources yet unable to extract the resources due to financial and technological constraints. 
Foreign currencies provided by investors may further give rise to additional public and 
private corruption if they are misallocated or misappropriated. 
Alleviating corruption may become more and more difficult as more natural resources 
are exploited. This can be put into perspective by analyzing the threshold income level above 
which increased FDI activities will lead to lower corruption. At fuel>10, the income 
threshold is approximately US$2720. The level, however, jumps to US$6200 for fuel>30 
                                                 
8 We are in no way suggesting that FDI activities are contributing to corruption in host countries. Instead, what we are suggesting here is 
that authoritarian regimes can make quick decision on the sale of natural resource should there arises a need to do so. As far as authoritarian 
regimes are concerned, the need to exploit more natural resource can be a direct consequence of domestic macroeconomic mismanagement 
such as higher inflation, insufficient foreign revenues, and inadequate public service provision. As such, exchanging natural resource for 
much needed foreign currencies can be a quick fix. If we have a situation like this, then we can see that corruption and FDI are jointly 
determined. 
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economies and US$12,260 for fuel >50 economies, respectively. These represent 127% and 
350% increases as compared to fuel>10. Countries such as Nigeria, Russia, and Saudi Arabia 
offer good casual illustrations. These countries represent economies whose fuel exports 
exceed 50% (more than 85% for Saudi Arabia and Nigeria).  
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Table (2) : Dependent Variable - Corruption Perception Index 
  Conditional On 
  1 2 3 4 
  
Fuel > 30 & non-
OECD 
Fuel > 30, non-OECD & 
Development Level 
Fuel > 30, non-
OECD & 
Democracy 
Fuel > 30 & Authoritarian 
Regime (polity <10) 
lnfdi 0.068 *** 0.943 * 0.155 ** 0.102 *** 
  (0.044)   (0.108)   (0.062)   (0.063)   
lngnipc -0.727 *     -0.719 * -0.622 * 
  (0.080)       (0.079)   (0.121)   
lnfdi_lngnipc     -0.108 *         
      (0.013)           
lnfdi_polity         -0.012 **     
          (0.006)       
fuel 0.021 * 0.018 * 0.022 * 0.016   
  (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.011)   
lnopen -0.706 * -1.065 * -0.662 * -1.401 * 
  (0.212)   (0.208)   (0.211)   (0.356)   
cath80 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 0.009 *** 0.031   
  (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.020)   
musl80 -0.015 ** -0.015 ** -0.017 * -0.010   
  (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.011)   
prot80 0.018   0.039 ** 0.012   0.009   
  (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.018)   (0.036)   
ethnic -1.458 * -1.983 * -1.448 * -1.801 * 
  (0.489)   (0.521)   (0.483)   (0.594)   
asia (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
africa 1.300   1.934 *** 1.390   (dropped)   
  (1.011)   (1.042)   (1.001)       
sam 0.029   0.717   0.142   (dropped)   
  (1.108)   (1.156)   (1.097)       
meast 1.113   1.583   1.200   0.031   
  (1.044)   (1.079)   (1.033)   (0.575)   
leg_british -0.661   -0.797   -0.859   0.962   
  (1.058)   (1.089)   (1.051)   (0.655)   
leg_french -0.688   -0.902   -0.825   0.594   
  (1.090)   (1.121)   (1.080)   (0.711)   
leg_german (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
leg_scan (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
landlock 0.971 * 1.268 * 0.825 * 1.416 * 
  (0.276)   (0.280)   (0.284)   (0.438)   
polity 0.017   0.017   0.091 ** 0.102   
  (0.019)   (0.019)   (0.043)   (0.077)   
tropic -0.725 * -1.146 * -0.690 ** -1.214 * 
  (0.337)   (0.360)   (0.334)   (0.411)   
alldem95 (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
_cons 14.761 * 10.654 * 14.175 * 16.364 * 
  (1.053)   (0.981)   (1.084)   (1.279)   
# of Observations 135   135   135   84   
R-squared 0.82   0.81   0.83   0.86   
Adj R-squared 0.79   0.78   0.80   0.83   
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table (3) : Dependent Variable - Corruption Perception Index 
  Conditional On 
  1 2 3 4 
  
Fuel > 50 & non-
OECD 
Fuel > 50, non-OECD  
& Development Level 
Fuel > 50, non- 
OECD & Democracy 
Fuel > 50 & Authoritarian 
Regime (polity <10) 
lnfdi 0.086 *** 0.819 * 0.074   0.108 *** 
  (0.054)   (0.128)   (0.075)   (0.068)   
lngnipc -0.552 *     -0.552 * -0.497 * 
  (0.088)       (0.088)   (0.145)   
lnfdi_lngnipc     -0.087 *         
      (0.015)           
lnfdi_polity         0.002       
          (0.009)       
fuel 0.029 * 0.024 * 0.029 * 0.045 * 
  (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.017)   
lnopen -1.562 * -1.767 * -1.570 * -2.092 * 
  (0.301)   (0.293)   (0.305)   (0.486)   
cath80 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.014   -0.007   
  (0.008)   (0.009)   (0.009)   (0.028)   
musl80 -0.012   -0.011   -0.012   -0.027 ** 
  (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.017)   
prot80 0.048 *** 0.063 ** 0.048 *** 0.086   
  (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.055)   
ethnic -1.080   -1.570 ** -1.094   -1.679 ** 
  (0.721)   (0.761)   (0.728)   (0.856)   
asia (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
africa 0.729 ** 0.751 ** 0.633   -0.272   
  (0.344)   (0.351)   (0.681)   (0.878)   
sam 0.125   0.182   (dropped)   (dropped)   
 (0.807)   (0.822)           
meast (dropped)   (dropped)   -0.104   -0.903 ** 
          (0.817)   (0.564)   
leg_british 0.309   0.659   0.500   0.435   
  (1.193)   (1.235)   (0.906)   (0.277)   
leg_french -0.085   0.279   0.104   (dropped)   
  (1.196)   (1.241)   (0.927)       
leg_german (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
leg_scan (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
landlock 1.044   1.312   1.133   (dropped)   
  (0.912)   (0.935)   (0.999)       
polity -0.004   -0.003   -0.017   -0.056   
  (0.029)   (0.030)   (0.063)   (0.113)   
tropic -1.849 * -2.041 * -1.862 * -2.321 * 
  (0.431)   (0.442)   (0.438)   (0.602)   
alldem95 (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
_cons 16.396 * 12.859 * 16.449 * 19.711 * 
  (1.232)   (1.303)   (1.261)   (2.210)   
# of Observations 93   93   93   61   
R-squared 0.87   0.86   0.87   0.88   
Adj R-squared 0.84   0.84   0.84   0.85   
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Income per capita is found to be stagnant in these resource-rich economies in the past years 
(a decline is observed in Nigeria). This then suggests that if growth in income per capita fails 
to keep up with FDI growth, corruption will continue to be a major issue for these 
economies. This anecdotal evidence seems to be consistent with our findings. Pumping out 
and exporting more natural resources convey a similar conclusion; at fuel>10, the estimated 
coefficient for the fuel variable is 0.014, whereas it is 0.021 for fuel>30 and 0.029 for 
fuel>50, which lead us to conclude that developing countries exceedingly rich in resource are 
paying higher prices in term of corruption level. On the other hand, the returns (in term of 
corruption level) for adopting more open and transparent policies are relatively high for 
economies abundantly endowed with natural resource (-0.622 for fuel>10, -0.706 for fuel 
>30 and -1.562 for fuel>50). Our result shows that consumption of more FDI results in more 
corruption in resource-rich developing economies managed by authoritarian regimes. For 
fuel>10 economies, the estimate for lnfdi is 0.052 if economies are managed by all type of 
regimes, while it is 0.076 if managed by repressive regimes. For fuel > 30, the estimate is 
0.068 if managed by all type of regimes, whereas it is 0.102 if managed by repressive 
regimes. For fuel>50 economies, the estimate for lnfdi is 0.086 if managed by all type of 
regimes, and it is 0.108 if managed by repressive regimes. These findings lead us to conclude 
that when elected officials in resource-rich economies are not accountable to their 
constituents, increased inflow of FDI will result in higher corruption. Countries like Burma, 
Sudan, and Angola fit well into this prediction. 
For additional robust evidence that corruption is endogenous to FDI, we conduct 
similar regression analysis conditional on non-OECD economies whose income per capita is 
less than US$10000 and fuel export exceed 10%, Asian economies, and African economies 
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respectively. Estimated results are shown in tables 4 & 5. Conditional on income per capita 
less than US$ 10000 only, lnfdi lost its significance. On the other had, if conditional on 
income per capita less than US$10000, fuel>10, and fuel>30, the estimated coefficient for 
lnfdi becomes not only positive but significant (table 4, model 1 & 2), implying that the 
relationship between FDI and corruption level is highly correlated and significant in 
resource-rich developing economies. Even in the absence of abundant natural resources in 
host countries, FDI activities are positively correlated with corruption in low income 
economies managed by authoritarian regimes9 (table 4, model 3). To compare and contrast 
the results between resource-rich non-OECD economies with OECD economies, we also 
include a regression model for OECD economies (table 5, model 1). The sign of coefficient 
for lnfdi becomes negative and significant for OECD countries. In addition, if conditional on 
OECD economies with fuel>10, the sign of the coefficient for lnfdi still remains negative and 
significant (not included in table5), which suggests that, unlike what occurs in resource-rich 
developing economies, availability of abundant natural resource offers no explanation for the 
incident of higher corruption in developed economies.  
Unlike OECD economies, Asian economies display a paradox. Conditional on all 
Asian economies (table 5 model 2), the sign of the coefficient for lnfdi has now become 
positive and is highly significant, a situation that seems to be consistent with our hypothesis 
that all investors do not necessarily eschew countries where corruption is persistent. Barring 
advanced Asian and Australian economies such as Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand, 
Japan, and South Korea, corruption is considered to be highly prevalent in this region. Yet, 
                                                 
9 Again we are not implying that FDI is ennobling repressive regimes and hence contributing to corruption. If we combine all type of 
economies with all kind of regimes, the sign may reverse and become negative. Indeed, there is a strand of literature that has proved that 
FDI in general tend to avoid economies where human right abuses and rule of law are disregarded (see Harms & Ursprung 2002 for details). 
Our goal of doing this analysis is to show that FDI and corruption can be jointly determined in some situations. 
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investors don’t seem to be deterred by this. Consider a few Asian economies: China, 
Vietnam, Burma, Indonesia and India (just to name a few). Despite being consistently ranked 
high on corruption perception indices, these countries have remained favorite destinations for 
most international investors. Unlike their Asian counterparts, African economies display two 
distinct trends in their association with FDI activities. There are a total of 343 observations 
for all African economies. Of which, there are 113 observations with fuel exports exceeding 
10%. Despite their small sample size (32%) relative to entire African economies, African 
economies whose fuel exports exceed 10% take in the lion share of investment dollars 
flowing into the African continent (64%). These casual observations may suggest that there 
exist two distinct groups of investors pursuing two distinct goals. Although we have no 
information regarding which industries FDI are investing, we have strong evidence that FDI 
inflows into resource-rich African economies is disproportionately high. A preliminary visual 
inspection of scatter plots (figure 6 & 7 & 8) confirms our observation. If we combine all 
African economies, the relationship between FDI and corruption is unclear (figure 6). 
However, if conditional on fuel<10 African economies, FDI activities are negatively 
associated with corruption (figure 8). On the other hand, FDI activities in fuel>10 African 
economies is positively associated with corruption (figure 7). This impression is further 
confirmed by the regression results shown in table 5 model 3; estimate for lnfdi is negative 
and significant if all African economies are combined together; the sign, however, reverses 
and becomes positive and is highly significant (1% alpha value) if we are to include only 
African economies whose fuel exports exceed 10% (model 4).  
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Figure (6) 
LnFDI Vs CPI – All African Economies 
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Figure (7) 
LnFDI Vs CPI – African Economies with fuel >10 
(Account for 64% of all FDI in Africa) 
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Figure (8) 
LnFDI Vs CPI – African Economies with fuel <10 
(Account for 36% of all FDI in Africa) 
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Table (4) : Dependent Variable - Corruption Perception Index 
  Conditional On 
  1 2 3 
  
Fuel > 10 & GNI Per 
Capita < 10000 
Fuel > 30 & GNI Per 
Capita < 10000 
GNI Per Capita < 10000 & 
Authoritarian Regime (Polity <10) 
lnfdi 0.072 * 0.083 *** 0.038 *** 
  (0.026)   (0.044)   (0.022)   
lngnipc -0.562 * -0.779 * -0.472 * 
  (0.053)   (0.089)   (0.061)   
fuel 0.013 * 0.017 * 0.008 * 
  (0.002)   (0.004)   (0.002)   
lnopen -0.456 * -0.542 * -0.158 *** 
  (0.110)   (0.198)   (0.094)   
cath80 0.015 * 0.014 * -0.006 *** 
  (0.004)   (0.006)   (0.004)   
musl80 -0.001   -0.012 ** 0.001   
  (0.002)   (0.006)   (0.002)   
prot80 0.004   0.012   0.021 * 
  (0.005)   (0.017)   (0.006)   
ethnic 0.140   -1.262 * 0.444 ** 
  (0.247)   (0.510)   (0.200)   
asia 0.396   0.292   -0.291   
  (0.280)   (1.048)   (0.260)   
africa 0.099   1.384 * -0.438   
  (0.313)   (0.412)   (0.368)   
sam -1.120 * (dropped)   0.621   
  (0.289)       (0.525)   
meast -0.314   1.097 ** -1.351 * 
  (0.364)   (0.478)   (0.342)   
leg_british -0.751 ** -0.726   -0.023   
  (0.325)   (0.616)   (0.278)   
leg_french -0.529   -0.827   -0.102   
  (0.353)   (0.599)   (0.327)   
leg_german (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
leg_scan (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
landlock 0.363 ** 0.766 * -0.101   
  (0.151)   (0.271)   (0.126)   
polity 0.038 * 0.021   0.016   
  (0.010)   (0.017)   (0.023)   
tropic -0.173   -0.849 ** 0.090   
  (0.147)   (0.358)   (0.151)   
alldem95 -0.971 * (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.284)           
_cons 11.901 * 14.464 * 10.754 * 
  (0.589)   (1.053)   (0.654)   
# of Observations 241   122   218   
R-squared 0.70   0.79   0.73   
Adj R-squared 0.68   0.76   0.70   
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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Table (5) : Dependent Variable - Corruption Perception Index 
  Conditional On 
  1 2 3 4 
  OECD Countries Asian Countries African Countries   
African Countries 
with Fuel>10 
lnfdi -0.108 ** 0.178 * -0.060 ** 0.109 * 
  (0.046)   (0.051)   (0.025)   (0.038)   
lngnipc -0.227   -1.742 * -0.461 * -0.161 * 
  (0.172)   (0.074)   (0.046)   (0.065)   
fuel 0.015 * -0.002   0.012 * 0.007 ** 
  (0.004)   (0.008)   (0.002)   (0.003)   
lnopen -0.912 * -0.266 ** 0.174 ** 0.055   
  (0.129)   (0.141)   (0.095)   (0.149)   
cath80 -0.022 * 0.001   0.003   -0.004   
  (0.003)   (0.006)   (0.003)   (0.005)   
musl80 -0.819 * 0.005   0.001   -0.003   
  (0.107)   (0.004)   (0.002)   (0.005)   
prot80 -0.045 * 0.006   0.005   0.007   
  (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.004)   (0.008)   
ethnic -0.500 *** 0.346   1.223 * 2.151 *** 
  (0.316)   (0.436)   (0.285)   (1.141)   
asia -2.372 * (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.279)               
africa (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
sam (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
meast 77.249 * (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (10.392)               
leg_british -2.875 * 0.164   -0.146 ** -0.038   
  (0.347)   (0.267)   (0.076)   (0.187)   
leg_french -1.766 * 0.382   (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.296)   (0.499)           
leg_german -2.414 * 2.665 * (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.333)   (0.391)           
leg_scandi~n -3.173 * (dropped)   (dropped)   (dropped)   
  (0.446)               
landlock -0.108   -0.127   -0.170 ** 0.200   
  (0.248)   (0.335)   (0.084)   (0.153)   
polity -1.401 * 0.045 * -0.048 * -0.009   
  (0.153)   (0.013)   (0.007)   (0.012)   
tropic -0.651 ** 0.692 * -0.178   -0.583   
  (0.313)   (0.239)   (0.217)   (0.774)   
alldem95 0.475 * -1.121 * -0.713 ** -2.757 * 
  (0.192)   (0.239)   (0.315)   (0.776)   
_cons 42.544 * 17.561 * 9.291 * 6.657 * 
  (2.507)   (0.576)   (0.527)   (0.910)   
# of Observations 180   135   254   92   
R-squared 0.92   0.94   0.69   0.77   
Adj R-squared 0.91   0.93   0.67   0.73   
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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So far, we have shown that investors’ response to corruption may not be uniform 
across economies as the existing literature assumes. If we randomly take a sample of 
economies and run a regression, we are likely to observe a negative relationship between FDI 
and corruption. However, as has been shown, this may not be the case for all economies. 
Depending on the investors’ strategic goals, economic and political situations, and available 
resource levels in host economies, corruption can be endogenous to FDI and the relationship 
can be a positive one. These findings suggest that the simultaneity between FDI and 
corruption can not be discounted. As a result, estimates obtained from OLS estimation will 
be inconsistent and biased.    
 
B. Joint Determination of Corruption and FDI   
 
In the preceding section, we discussed the potential endogeneity of the corruption 
variable in the FDI single equation model. Taking this issue into consideration, let us 
consider the following two-equation model in which corruption and FDI are jointly 
determined. Equation (1) represents the behavioral equation confronting investors, whereas 
equation (2) represents the behavioral equation confronting host economies. In both 
equations, FDI and corruption variables are considered endogenous. Corruption can affect 
FDI via equation 1, whereas FDI can affect corruption via equation 2. In each equation 1 & 
2, the number of excluded exogenous variables is larger than the number of included 
endogenous variable in the right hand side of each equation, and at least one of the excluded 
exogenous variables is statistically different from zero (results shown in tables 6 & 7 & 8), 
each equation is identified ( in our case, the model is over-identified).  
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(1) lnfdi = a0 + a1cpi + a2lnpop + a3lngdp + a4lngnipc + a5inf + a6gdpgr + a7tax +  
   a8openess + a9fuel + a10illit + a11polity + a12asia + a13africa +  
   a14meast + a15sam + a16yr2001 + a17yr2002 + a18yr2003 + a19yr2004  
   + a20yr2005 + a21yr2006 + µ1 
(2) cpi = b0 + b1lnfdi + b2lngnipc + b3inf + b4openess + b5fuel + b6polity +  
   b7asia + b8africa + b9meast + b10sam + b11leg_british + b12leg_french +  
   b13leg_german + b14leg_scan + b15prot80 + b16cath80 + b17musl80 +  
   b18alldem95 + b19federal + b20noncol + b21ethnic + µ2 
 In the FDI equation, we include exogenous variables considered to be major 
determinants of FDI. Population, GDP, and income per capita measure market size, 
development level and purchasing power. Inflation and GDP growth represent 
macroeconomic indicators and tax represents corporate statutory tax rate. Though it is 
assumed that investors tend to invest in economies where the tax rate is low, our results do 
not reflect this notion. As before, openness measures the degree to which host economies are 
open to the rest of the world. We include a fuel variable in the FDI equation to account for 
the fact that some investors tend to invest in fuel exporting economies to lower fuel costs. 
The variable illit is a measure for the illiteracy rate which reflects productivity of labor force 
in host economies. To avoid omitted variable bias, the democracy variable polity is included 
as it has been argued in some literature that investors tend to invest in economies where 
freedom and human rights are respected. Finally, we include year dummies to adjust for 
business cycle fluctuations from year 2000 to 2006. 
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  We first estimate equations 1&2 using 2sls, conditional on non-OECD economies 
with fuel >10. Results shown in table (6) reveal that the worsening of corruption in host 
economies leads to a reduced inflow of FDI. On the flip side of the coin, in the corruption 
equation, increased inflow of FDI also results in a higher level of corruption in host 
economies. More importantly, the coefficients for the lnfdi and corruption variable are 
statistically significant from zero confirms the existence of a simultaneity problem. 
Moreover, in both equations, the exogenous variables considered to be major determinants of 
FDI (population, GDP, income per capita, openness, fuel, democracy, illiteracy rate) and 
corruption (income per capita, openness, fuel, legal origins, protestant population, catholic 
population, muslin population, all-time democracy, never a colony, and ethnic-linguistic 
fractionalization) are robust, highly significant and correctly signed.   
 Next, we also would like to test if the impacts are different in resource-rich African 
economies as compared to other region. We estimate equations 1&2 including only African 
economies with fuel exports exceeding 10% and the results are shown in table (7). The 
coefficients for the corruption variable and lnfdi are highly significance, confirming that 
simultaneity is an issue. Coefficients for major determinants of FDI and corruption are also 
robust and significant.  
There are a number of interesting observations to be made from table 7. First, the 
coefficients for lnfdi and corruption variables remain almost the same as compared to 
previous results shown in table 6. On the other hand, the coefficients for other major 
exogenous variables have changed significantly, notably coefficients for population, GDP, 
income per capita, legal origins, and religious population. This is, however, expected since 
African economies are fundamentally different from other economies in term of their legal 
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origins, colonial history, development level, and religious practices. Finally, we estimate 
equations 1&2 again but including only Middle Eastern oil exporting economies to see if the 
impacts are different. Estimated results are shown in table (8). The existence of simultaneity 
is again confirmed by the fact that both coefficients of corruption variable and lnfdi are 
significant. There is one striking observation that distinguishes Middle Eastern economies 
from others. First, the sign of the corruption variable in FDI equation has changed from being 
negative to being positive. This result seems unexpected and may look strange at first glance. 
However, if we consider the strategic importance of Middle Eastern economies economically 
to the rest of the world, this result seems to make economic sense: Middle Eastern oil 
exporting economies account for more than 60% of the world’s proven oil reserves; despite 
high perceived corruption level in these economies, FDI will continue to flow into this region 
given their economic and strategic importance to the rest of the world. Hence, corruption 
doesn’t matter much to investors investing in resource-rich Middle Eastern economies. The 
coefficients for lnpop, lngdp, and lngnipc have changed significantly. In the corruption 
equation, the coefficient for lnfdi has halved for Middle Eastern economies (from 0.2 in 
previous results to 0.1). This implies that, given the same amount of FDI flowing into both 
regions (Africa and Middle East), the consumption of FDI in resource-rich Middle Eastern 
economies results in lower corruption than it is in resource-rich African economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 40
Table 6: non-OECD economies with fuel >10 
  FDI equation   Corruption Equation 
  Coef.   Std. Err.   Coef.   Std. Err. 
constant 30.721   7.277   9.854   0.521 
cpi -0.760 * 0.245         
lnfdi         0.222 * 0.044 
lnpop -3.654 * 0.795         
lngdp 4.677 * 0.820         
lngnipc -4.368 * 0.897   -0.550 * 0.053 
inf -0.002   0.002   -0.002 *** 0.001 
gdpgr -0.009   0.015         
tax 0.031 * 0.009         
openess 0.006 ** 0.003   -0.009 * 0.001 
fuel 0.010 ** 0.004   0.006 * 0.002 
illit 0.016 ** 0.007         
polity -0.058 * 0.017   0.012   0.011 
asia -1.252 * 0.328   0.162   0.286 
africa -1.301 * 0.354   -0.202   0.345 
meast -2.747 * 0.453   -0.640 *** 0.375 
sam 0.860 * 0.307   -1.120 * 0.427 
yr2001 -0.399   0.258         
yr2002 -0.063   0.255         
yr2003 0.207   0.263         
yr2004 0.301   0.269         
yr2005 0.284   0.261         
yr2006 0.297   0.300         
leg_british         -1.001 * 0.367 
leg_french         -0.864 ** 0.383 
leg_german         (dropped)     
leg_scan         (dropped)     
prot80         0.022 * 0.006 
cath80         0.018 * 0.004 
musl80         0.007 * 0.003 
alldem95         -1.315 * 0.397 
federal         -0.070   0.149 
noncol         0.434 * 0.153 
ethnic         0.535 * 0.261 
# of observations 250       250     
R-squared 0.64       0.74     
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. 
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Table 7: non-OECD African Economies with fuel >10 
  FDI equation   Corruption Equation 
  Coef.   Std. Err.   Coef.   Std. Err. 
constant 20.572   6.967   6.037   0.801 
cpi -0.958 * 0.276         
lnfdi         0.202 * 0.062 
lnpop -1.978 ** 0.918         
lngdp 3.021 * 0.974         
lngnipc -2.912 * 0.963   -0.180 * 0.064 
inf -0.002 *** 0.001   0.001   0.001 
gdpgr -0.020   0.014         
tax 0.008   0.017         
openess 0.027 * 0.004   0.000   0.002 
fuel 0.014 * 0.005   0.009 ** 0.004 
illit 0.017 * 0.006         
polity -0.137 * 0.023   0.008   0.015 
asia (dropped)             
africa (dropped)             
meast (dropped)             
sam (dropped)             
yr2001 -0.151   0.306         
yr2002 0.008   0.304         
yr2003 0.421   0.310         
yr2004 0.332   0.313         
yr2005 0.385   0.314         
yr2006 0.133   0.332         
Leg_british         (dropped)     
Leg_french         0.228 *** 0.127 
leg_german         (dropped)     
leg_scan         (dropped)     
prot80         0.017 ** 0.008 
cath80         -0.017 * 0.005 
musl80         -0.008 * 0.003 
alldem95         -2.990 * 0.507 
federal         -0.488 *** 0.277 
noncol         -0.406 *** 0.219 
ethnic         1.968 * 0.482 
# of observations 92       92     
R-squared 0.72       0.76     
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42
 
Table 8: Non-OECD Middle Eastern Economies with fuel >10 
  FDI equation   Corruption Equation 
  Coef.   Std. Err.   Coef.   Std. Err. 
constant 70.032   20.157   13.899   2.956 
cpi 1.333 * 0.414         
lnfdi         0.107 * 0.027 
lnpop -12.193 * 3.457         
lngdp 10.927 * 3.408         
lngnipc -9.643 * 2.929   -0.475 * 0.051 
inf 0.008   0.044   0.001   0.011 
gdpgr -0.114   0.083         
tax 0.033   0.035         
openess 0.000   0.013   -0.004   0.004 
fuel -0.040 * 0.016   0.006   0.007 
illit 0.279 * 0.071         
polity 0.193 * 0.054   -0.052 * 0.015 
asia (dropped)             
africa (dropped)             
meast (dropped)             
sam (dropped)             
yr2001 -0.577   0.456         
yr2002 0.488   0.470         
yr2003 1.185 ** 0.511         
yr2004 1.490 * 0.508         
yr2005 1.715 * 0.436         
yr2006 2.060 * 0.545         
Leg_british         (dropped)     
Leg_french         1.163   1.083 
leg_german         (dropped)     
leg_scan         Dropped)     
prot80         1.063   1.492 
cath80         1.065 * 0.207 
musl80         -0.068 * 0.023 
alldem95         (dropped)     
federal         (dropped)     
noncol         3.261 * 0.641 
ethnic         -2.104   1.665 
# of observations 40       40     
R-squared 0.85       0.98     
* represents statistical significance at 1%, ** at 5%, *** at 10%. 
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V. Conclusion 
This study is primarily motivated by observing idiosyncratic behavior of some 
investors operating in resource-rich developing economies. We depart from the existing 
literature and conventional assumption that investors will react pessimistically towards 
worsening corruption in host countries and that corruption is taken exogenously. Instead, 
conditional on economic and political dimensions, we show that the relationship between 
corruption and FDI can be two-way causal one and investors will react differently depending 
upon their strategic goals, economic and political conditions prevailing in host countries. We 
find that the impact of FDI on corruption is different for different continental regions. Asian 
economies show a different pattern as compared to other regions. The relationship between 
lnfdi and corruption is found to be positively and highly significant for Asian economies. We 
also notice two different distributional patterns of FDI in African economies if we break 
down the economies by resource availability. The minimum threshold level of income 
beyond which increased inflow of FDI will result in lower corruption increases with the 
increased availability of resources. The impact is much greater for resource-rich economies 
managed by authoritarian regimes. Finally, to account for simultaneity between corruption 
and FDI, we use a simultaneous equation model to estimate the parameters. We estimate a 
system of simultaneous equations for three disaggregated samples (non-OECD economies 
with fuel>10, African economies with fuel>10, and Middle Eastern economies with fuel>10). 
In all three disaggregated samples, our results obtained from 2sls estimations confirm that 
there is a simultaneity issue as the coefficients for both corruption variable and FDI are 
highly significant. The coefficients of other major determinants of corruption and FDI are 
also robust and strong.     
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Appendix A 
 
Summary Statistics for OECD Countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fdi 187 25942 44437.37 -35601.00 321274 
cpi 187 3 2.02 0.00 6.90 
pop 187 39916 56023 281.00 296507 
gdp 187 1027369 2022652 7901.00 12400000 
gnipc 187 26266 13734 3250.00 70330 
inf 187 3.86 6.93 -0.90 54.92 
gdpgr 187 2.98 2.01 -5.70 9.37 
tax 187 28.42 7.14 8.50 39.00 
openess 187 81.62 48.04 20.48 326.60 
fuel 187 7.06 12.17 0.23 67.69 
illit 187 2.82 2.44 0.71 12.63 
polity 187 19.69 0.77 17.00 20.00 
prot80 187 28.46 33.77 0.00 97.80 
cath80 187 43.03 37.91 0.10 96.90 
musl80 187 4.11 18.81 0.00 99.20 
ethnic 187 0.22 0.20 0.00 0.71 
 
 
Summary Statistics for non-OECD Countries 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fdi 747 1795 6341 -4550 79127 
cpi 747 6.86 1.30 0.60 9.60 
pop 747 45729 161786 107 1311798 
gdp 747 64552 208743 199 2657875 
gnipc 747 2295 3825 80.00 31640 
inf 747 10.72 30.39 -9.62 550.01 
gdpgr 747 4.98 5.13 -31.30 62.32 
tax 747 27.81 9.01 0.00 54.00 
openess 747 85.81 48.69 19.35 462.46 
fuel 747 17.64 26.41 0.00 99.66 
illit 747 21.91 20.33 0.21 90.61 
polity 747 12.35 6.09 0.00 20.00 
prot80 747 8.50 13.96 0.00 66.00 
cath80 747 26.78 33.95 0.00 96.60 
musl80 747 27.73 36.48 0.00 99.70 
ethnic 747 0.51 0.24 0.00 0.93 
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Summary Statistics for non-OECD Countries (fuel>10) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fdi 268 1389 2963 -4550 30827 
cpi 268 7.11 1.14 0.6 9 
pop 268 36452 78737 650.08 1094583 
gdp 268 64810 119039 410 990577 
gnipc 268 2771 4383 80 31640 
inf 268 15.75 47.69 -5.36 550.01 
gdpgr 268 5.56 5.55 -31.3 34.5 
tax 268 27.97 10.38 0 54 
openess 268 85.01 41.92 21.74 447.3 
fuel 268 44.17 28.83 10.12 99.66 
illit 268 20.3 19.1 0.3 76.8 
polity 268 10.66 6.28 0.00 20.00 
prot80 268 7.78 12.39 0.00 58.40 
cath80 268 27.88 34.62 0.00 96.60 
musl80 268 37.47 39.05 0.00 99.40 
ethnic 268 0.58 0.23 0.04 0.91 
 
 
Summary Statistics for African Countries(fuel>10) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fdi 98 635.57 1063.09 -1304.0 6522.00 
cpi 98 7.67 0.60 5.20 9.00 
pop 98 27919.62 33379.88 1182.28 144720.00 
gdp 98 21806.08 35640.36 410.00 242059.00 
gnipc 98 905.51 1119.65 80.00 5360.00 
inf 98 25.16 74.83 -5.36 550.01 
gdpgr 98 4.94 6.66 -31.30 33.63 
tax 98 32.91 7.03 15.00 40.00 
openess 98 77.67 29.81 32.85 152.45 
fuel 98 41.36 30.51 10.34 99.66 
illit 98 38.38 17.24 12.45 76.82 
polity 98 10.62 4.72 3.00 19.00 
prot80 98 14.00 9.97 0.00 39.00 
cath80 98 27.62 22.75 0.50 68.70 
musl80 98 31.23 32.87 0.00 99.10 
ethnic 98 0.78 0.13 0.34 0.91 
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Summary Statistics for Middle Eastern Countries (fuel>10) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fdi 45 630.56 1673.08 -614.00 10043.00 
cpi 45 5.78 1.23 3.70 7.30 
pop 45 28062.32 28647.29 650.08 74166.50 
gdp 45 86233.27 85800.62 7929.00 356630.00 
gnipc 45 7710.67 7464.53 960.00 31640.00 
inf 45 3.80 5.43 -3.85 16.47 
gdpgr 45 5.07 2.78 0.13 16.50 
tax 45 18.47 17.10 0.00 54.00 
openess 45 79.55 29.05 39.02 153.83 
fuel 45 73.47 19.10 12.09 93.51 
illit 45 17.31 6.44 5.84 28.60 
polity 45 3.69 3.39 0.00 13.00 
prot80 45 0.20 0.26 0.00 0.90 
cath80 45 0.65 0.73 0.10 2.10 
musl80 45 93.70 6.04 81.80 99.40 
ethnic 45 0.44 0.20 0.04 0.67 
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Appendix B (Country List) 
OECD  Non-OECD 
Australia   Albania  Costa Rica  Kazakhstan  Peru  
Austria   Algeria  Cote d'Ivoire  Kenya  Philippines  
Belgium   Angola  Djibouti  Kuwait  Romania  
Canada   Argentina  Dominican Republic  Kyrgyz Republic  Russian Federation  
Denmark   Armenia  Ecuador  Lao PDR  Rwanda  
Finland   Azerbaijan  Egypt, Arab Rep.  Latvia  Saudi Arabia  
France   Bahrain  El Salvador  Lesotho  Senegal  
Germany   Bangladesh  Equatorial Guinea  Liberia  Singapore  
Greece   Belarus  Estonia  Madagascar  Solomon Islands  
Hungary   Benin  Ethiopia  Malawi  South Africa  
Iceland   Bhutan  Fiji  Malaysia  Sri Lanka  
Ireland   Bolivia  Gabon  Mali  Sudan  
Italy   Botswana  Gambia, The  Mauritania  Swaziland  
Japan   Brazil  Georgia  Mauritius  Syrian Arab Republic  
Korea, Rep.   Bulgaria  Ghana  Moldova  Tajikistan  
Mexico   Burkina Faso  Guatemala  Mongolia  Tanzania  
Netherlands   Burundi  Guinea  Morocco  Thailand  
New Zealand   Cambodia  Guinea-Bissau  Mozambique  Togo  
Norway   Cameroon  Guyana  Nepal  Trinidad and Tobago  
Poland   Central African Rep. Haiti  Nicaragua  Tunisia  
Portugal   Chad  Honduras  Niger  Uganda  
Spain   Chile  India  Nigeria  Ukraine  
Sweden   China  Indonesia  Oman  Uruguay  
Switzerland   Colombia  Iran, Islamic Rep.  Pakistan  Uzbekistan  
Turkey   Comoros  Israel  Panama  Venezuela, RB  
United Kingdom   Congo, Dem. Rep.  Jamaica  Papua New Guinea  Vietnam  
United States   Congo, Rep.  Jordan  Paraguay  Zambia  
          Zimbabwe  
African Economies (fuel>10)  Middle Eastern Economies (fuel>10) 
Algeria   Bahrain  
Angola   Egypt, Arab Rep.  
Cameroon   Iran, Islamic Rep.  
Chad   Kuwait  
Congo, Dem. Rep.   Oman  
Congo, Rep.   Saudi Arabia  
Cote d'Ivoire   Syrian Arab Republic  
Gabon   Tunisia  
Ghana    
Kenya   Asian Economies (fuel>10) 
Liberia   Indonesia  
Mali   Papua New Guinea  
Mozambique   Vietnam  
Nigeria    
Senegal    
South Africa    
Sudan    
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Appendix C (Variable List) 
 
Variable Name   Description and Source 
fdi   Foreign Direct Investment in Million Dollar. Source:World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2008) 
cpi   Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index obtained from 
http://www.transparency.org/ 
gdp   GDP in Million Dollar. Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2008) 
pop   Population in thousand unit. Source: World Development Indicatos CD-ROM 
(2008) 
gnipc   Income Per Capita in Dollar Unit. Source: World Development Indicators CD-
ROM (2008) 
inf   Consumer Price Index. Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM (2008) 
gdpgr   Annual GDP Growth (%). Source: World Development Indicators CD-ROM 
(2008) 
tax   Stautory Corporate Tax Rate. Source: World Bank Doing Business. 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
openess   Import and Export Values as % of GDP. Source: World Development Indicators 
CD-ROM (2008) 
fuel   Fuel Export as % of Total Merchandise Export (%). Source: World Development 
Indicators CD-ROM (2008) 
noncol   Never a colony, mostly from Treisman, "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-
National Study," Journal of Public Economics, June 2000.  
illit   Illiteracy Rate. Source: UNESCO 
polity   Democracy Index. Source: Polity IV Web Site. 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
africa,asia,meast,sam   Regional Dummies 
yr200x   Year Dummies 
leg_british   legal origin:  British. Source: La Porta (1999) 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
leg_french   legal origin:  French. Source: La Porta (1999) 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
leg_german   legal origin:  German. Source: La Porta (1999) 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
leg_scan    legal origin:  Scandinavian. Source: La Porta (1999) 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/publications.html 
cath80   Catholics as % of population 1980, from La Porta et al. 1999. "The Quality of 
Government," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, downloaded from 
Quality of Government Database, at Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg 
University.  
prot80   Protestants as % of population 1980, from La Porta et al. 1999. "The Quality of 
Government," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, downloaded from 
Quality of Government Database, at Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg 
University.  
musl80   Muslims as % of population 1980, from La Porta et al. 1999. "The Quality of 
Government," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, downloaded from 
Quality of Government Database, at Quality of Government Institute, Goteborg 
University.  
alldem95   Democratic all years from 1930 to 1995. Source: Treisman (2000) 
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federal   Classified as a federation by Elazar (Elazar, Daniel J. 1995. “From Statism to 
Federalism: A Paradigm Shift,” Publius, 25, 2, spring, pp.5-18.); plus Ethiopia, 
Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became federal after the article.  
ethnic   Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, 1961, = probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a given country will not be from same ethnolinguistic group. 
Source: Easterly and Levine (1997) 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/Easterly/Research.html#Publications 
landlock   dummy for landlocked countries. Source Sachs and Warner (1997) 
http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/1582 
tropic   Index for Tropical Countries. Source: Sachs and Warner (1997) 
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